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Abstract
Background: High out-of-pocket expenditures (OOPE) make delivery care difficult to access for a large proportion
of India’s population. Given that home deliveries increase the risk of maternal mortality, in 2005 the Indian
Government implemented the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) program to incentivize poor women to deliver in
public health facilities by providing a cash transfer upon discharge. We study the OOPE among JSY beneficiaries
and women who deliver at home, and predictors of OOPE in two districts of Madhya Pradesh.
Methods: September 2013 to April 2015 a cross-sectional community-based survey was performed. All recently
delivered women were interviewed to elicit delivery costs, socio-demographic characteristics and delivery related
information.
Results: Most women (n = 1995, 84 %) delivered in JSY public health facility, the remaining 16 % (n = 386) delivered
at home. Women who delivered under JSY program had a higher median, IQR OOPE ($8, 3–18) compared to home
($6, 2–13). Among JSY beneficiaries, poorest women had twice net gain ($20) versus wealthiest ($10) post cash
transfer. Informal payments (64 %) and food/baby items (77 %) were the two most common sources of OOPE.
OOPE made among JSY beneficiaries was pro-poor: poorer women made proportionally less expenditures
compared to wealthier women. In an adjusted model, delivering in a JSY public facility increased odds of incurring
expenditures (OR: 1.58, 95 % CI: 1.11–2.25) but at the same time to a 16 % (95 % CI: 0.73–0.96) decrease in the
amount paid compared to home deliveries.
Conclusions: OOPE is prevalent among JSY beneficiaries as well in home deliveries. In JSY, OOPE varies by income
quintile: wealthier quintiles pay more OOPE. However the cash incentive is adequate enough to provide a net gain
for all quintiles. OOPE was largely due to indirect costs and not direct medical payments. The program seems to be
effective in providing financial protection for the most vulnerable groups.
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Background
India’s health care services are largely financed by out-
of-pocket payments (71 %) at the point of care [1]. High
out-of-pocket expenditures (OOPE) make health ser-
vices, including care for childbirth, difficult to access for
a large proportion of its population especially the poor.
In 2005, institutional delivery was nearly 6.5 times
higher among Indian women belonging to the highest
wealth quintile (84 %) compared to poorest quintile
women (13 %) [2].
Evidence suggests maternal mortality can be reduced
when deliveries are conducted by skilled birth attendants
and women have access to emergency obstetric care,
given the unpredictable nature of life-threatening com-
plications that can occur at the time of childbirth [3].
Poor women, who have the least access to such care,
bear a disproportionate burden of maternal mortality.
Therefore governments in many low income settings,
with high burdens of maternal mortality, have initiated
special programs to draw women into facilities to give
birth (instead of at home), where such care can be pro-
vided. Given the high number of maternal deaths in
India (one-fifth of the global count) and a low institu-
tional delivery proportion (39 % in 2005); the Indian
government launched a conditional cash transfer pro-
gram to promote institutional delivery among poor
women the same year [2, 4]. The program, Janani Surak-
sha Yojana (JSY or safe motherhood program), provides
women $23 (INR 1400) upon discharge after giving birth
in a public health facility.
JSY, the largest cash transfer program in the world, is
funded by the central government of India (GOI) while
implementation is managed by states. Eligibility, incen-
tive amount and uptake differ across the states [5, 6]. In
the ten years since the program began, institutional de-
livery rates have increased to 74 % and more than 106
million women have benefited with the GOI spending
16.4 billion USD on the program [7–9].
Previous studies have found a considerable proportion
of Indian women cite financial access barriers as one of
the main reasons for not having an institutional delivery
[10–12]. The JSY program was expected to draw these
mothers into public facilities with the assumption that
they will receive a free delivery in addition to receiving
the cash incentive of $23. While all services in the In-
dian public sector are supposed to be free, in reality
OOPE during childbirth is common among these facil-
ities [13–17].
Although there are a number of reports on the JSY
[18–22], none focus on OOPE in the context of high
JSY program uptake [13–17, 23]. The magnitude of
OOPE incurred among these JSY beneficiaries is un-
known. In addition, we do not know if the cash incentive
offsets OOPE in the same facility, and if it does then the
extent to which it does. Also the question remains
whether the level of OOPE paid by JSY beneficiaries of
different socio-economic status is similar. Further, if
women who participate in the JSY program actually have
higher OOPE than women who give birth at home. We
studied the OOPE among JSY beneficiaries and com-
pared this OOPE to that incurred by women who
delivered at home in two districts of Madhya Pradesh,
India. We also described the extent to which the JSY
cash transfer defrayed the OOPE for JSY beneficiaries.
Among both groups of women, we studied predictors of
OOPE, and how OOPE varied with wealth status.
Methods
Study area
The study took place in two of the 51 administrative dis-
tricts that make up Madhya Pradesh (MP), a state in
central India. With a population of 71 million, it is one
of India’s largest states [24]. MP on the whole has poorer
socio-economic and health indicators relative to country
(India) averages; 24 % of the population lives below the
poverty line and has a maternal mortality ratio (MMR)
of 190 per 100,000 live births [25]. In MP, all women are
eligible to be beneficiaries of the JSY program regardless
of their poverty status, if they deliver in a public health
facility. MP has had one of the highest uptakes of JSY in
the country [26].
The two study districts were purposively selected to
represent different socio-economic and geographic areas
of MP. They were also study areas of a larger project
(MATIND) [27] to study the JSY program in which
this study was nested. Each study district (population
1.5–2 million) is divided into 5 administrative blocks
(100,000–200,000 people per block), each block com-
prises of villages with an approximate population of
1000–10,000 people per village. District one, situated
on the western side of the state, has relatively better
socio-economic characteristics, a lower MMR (176)
and a higher uptake of the JSY program (72 %) [26].
In comparison, district two which lies on the eastern
side of the state, has generally poorer socio-economic
characteristics, a higher MMR (361), and a lower JSY
uptake (59 %) [26]. The districts not only differ on
socio-economic characteristics, but also in regards to
geographical features. The first district is relatively
more urban and has a flat geographical terrain, while
the second district is mostly rural, has several hill
ranges as well as dense forested areas.
Study design and sampling
A community-based cross-sectional study was conducted
from September 2013 to April 2015. Study villages were
selected through a combination of multi-stage sampling in
the two districts. In the first district, all blocks were
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included. In the second district, two out of the five blocks
were purposively selected, one in the north and the other
in the south of the district. Within the selected blocks, vil-
lages that had between 200 and 10,000 inhabitants were
included in the sampling frame. All villages were stratified
into two groups based on a five kilometer (km) distance
from a public health facility that conducted more than 10
deliveries in a month. Probability proportionate to size
was used to select the individual study villages ensuring
the number of sample units in each stratum would be al-
located in proportion to their share in total population. In
total, 247 villages were selected, 101 and 146 villages
within and outside the five km radius of a facility,
respectively.
Data collection
The study participants (i.e., pregnant women who had
just given birth in each village) were identified with the
help of local community health workers (Accredited
Social Health Activist), local crèche workers, and trad-
itional birth attendants (Dai). The community workers
were incentivized to report births to the research team
within two days of delivery. As an additional measure to
ensure all births were identified, research teams fre-
quently visited the study villages throughout the recruit-
ment period. Trained research assistants interviewed
recently delivered mothers at a health facility or in their
home within the first week of delivery. They elicited in-
formation on out-of-pocket expenditures (OOPE) for
the current childbirth and other details including
maternal socio-demographic characteristics, birth order,
household wealth, location of delivery, and type of deliv-
ery. Family members provided additional information on
the costs if the mother could not recall or did not know.
During the recruitment period, 2779 births were re-
ported and 2615 women were enrolled in the study.
The reasons given for not enrolling in the study were
(i) the mother had migrated back to her resident vil-
lage (n = 108), (ii) the home was not accessible to the
research team (n = 52), (iii) maternal death (n = 8) and
(iv) two women refused to participate. A small number of
women (n = 8) reported that they did not know the cost of
the delivery thus were excluded from the analysis. Women
who delivered in a private facility (n = 226) were removed
from the analysis as the study focused on the JSY program
and OOPE. Also these women have significantly different
characteristics; they tend to be wealthier, live in urban set-
tings and are not the primary focus of the JSY program.
Definitions and variables used
The main outcome of interest, OOPE, was a sum of
the following expenditures (i.e., gross OOPE): 1.
Medicine, supplies and procedures (i.e., delivery costs,
medicines, supplies, blood transfusions, diagnostic tests,
and anesthesia); 2. Informal payments (i.e., expenditures
reported as ‘rewards’ paid by the women/families to the
staff for assisting their care in the facility. For the women
who delivered at home, cash given to the dai (traditional
birth attendant who conducts home deliveries) was classi-
fied as an informal payment; 3. Food/Cloth (i.e., food con-
sumed during hospital stay or at home in relation to the
delivery and cloths used for the infant), and 4. Transporta-
tion costs (i.e., all costs for the mother and her attendants
associated with reaching the health facility for delivery).
The OOPE were collected in Indian rupees (INR) and
converted to U.S. dollars (US$) using the exchange rate at
the time of the study of 60 INR to US$1.
Independent variables: Socio-demographic characteris-
tics included age and education as continuous variables
and caste1 as a categorical variable. Birth order was cate-
gorized by number of live births up to four (or more).
Women’s household wealth was assessed by using a
standard technique involving principal component ana-
lysis to construct a wealth index based on socio-
economic characteristics developed for the standard of
living index in the National Family Health Survey. The
variables included 20 household assets, structural mater-
ial of dwelling, sanitation provisions, and land ownership
[28, 29]. The household wealth index was calculated for
the entire study sample, then the score was categorized
into five quintiles. We used the wealth index as a proxy
measurement for wealth as income is a difficult variable
to collect in low-income settings. The mother could
have delivered under the JSY program at public facility
or at home. JSY beneficiaries were any woman who de-
livered in a public health facility and thus eligible to re-
ceive the cash incentive. Type of delivery was classified
into vaginal or cesarean section. We define the ‘net gain’
as the JSY incentive ($23) minus the OOPE.
Analysis
Univariate, bivariate and multivariable statistics were
used to describe and analyze the data. The dependent
variable, OOPE, was not normally distributed thus me-
dian and interquartile range (IQR) were used to describe
the data. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and Kruskal Wallis
tests were used to compare OOPE differences between
groups.
Inequalities in OOPE were analyzed using the concen-
tration curve and concentration index as demonstrated
by Wagstaff et al. [30]. The concentration curve plots
the cumulative percentage of OOPE (y-axis) against the
cumulative percentage of the women, ranked by their
wealth index, from the poorest to the richest households
(x-axis) [31]. We used the concetration curve to graphic-
ally display the inequalities in OOPE in this population.
The concentration index (CI), a range of −1 to 1,
allowed us to quantify the inequality in the OOPE. CI is
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defined graphically as twice the area between the con-
centration curve and the line of equality [32]. A positive
value indicates a progressive system where the wealthy
have more proportion of OOPE compared to the poor,
while a negative value indicates the opposite (and a re-
gressive system).
Multivariable analysis
A two-part model, developed as part of the Rand Health
Insurance Experiment, was used for the multivariable re-
gression to assess determinants of OOPE [33–36]. This
model is commonly used when studying health expendi-
tures to accommodate the significant number of zeros
(no expense incurred) and for its distribution (i.e., right
skewed with a long tail) which fits our data. The first
part, a binary logistic model, was used to understand the
predictors associated with any OOPE and estimated the
odds of a woman incurring any OOPE. We present the
coefficients as adjusted odds ratios (AOR) and 95 %
Confidence Intervals.
The second part of the model, a generalized linear
model (GLM) with a negative binomial distribution, ana-
lyzed the determinants of OOPE among women who re-
ported any OOPE. This model estimated the OOPE for
women who reported incurring an expense. We adjusted
for observable characteristics that may influence
delivery-related OOPE based on previous literature and
context specific knowledge. We present the coefficients
as incident rate ratios (IRR) and 95 % Confidence
Intervals.
Multicollinearity was assessed by calculating the mean
variance inflation factor (VIF = 1.53), which did not
show evidence of collinearity. No interaction existed
between the variables in the model. In all the models,
p-values <0.05 were considered significant.
Ethical considerations
The study was described to all study participants. In-
formed consent was obtained from the participants be-
fore they were enrolled in the study and responded to
the questionnaire. Anonymity and confidentiality was
ensured to all women. Ethical approval for the study was
granted by the Ethics Committee from the authors’
institution.
Results
Descriptive sample characteristics for the sample
As depicted in Table 1, the majority of women (n = 1995,
84 %) in our study delivered in a JSY public health facil-
ity. The remaining 16 % (n = 386) delivered at home.
The median age of the study sample was 23 years and
29 % (n = 692) had no formal education. More than a
third (n = 932) of the women were primiparous. The
main reason given for home deliveries was that the baby
came unexpectedly and quickly (n = 312, 52 %).
Other reasons included; planned to have a home
delivery (n = 97, 16 %), transportation related issues
(n = 95, 16 %), no one to accompany them to the
hospital (n = 58, 10 %) and other (n = 37, 6 %). Only
one woman replied she could not afford to deliver in
a health facility (results not shown).
Who had any OOPE?
Ninety one percent (n = 2172) of the sample reported
having OOPE; 92 % of JSY beneficiaries and 85 % of
women who delivered at home. From the descriptive
analysis in Table 1, women who delivered under the JSY
program had a significantly higher median, IQR OOPE
($8, 3–18) compared to women who delivered at home
($6, 2–13). The median, IQR OOPE significantly differed
between district one ($14, 7–23), and two ($3, 1–7). The
median OOPE increased with household wealth for
women who delivered in a JSY facility or at home. This
pattern was similar in both districts (data not shown).
Women from the scheduled tribe caste paid the least
OOPE (median $3, IQR 1–6) (Table 1). Women who de-
livered by caesarean section paid more than six times
(median $50, IQR 21–93) the amount compared to
women who delivered vaginally (median $8, IQR 3–17).
Does the JSY cash incentive defray OOPE?
Among the women who delivered in a JSY public facility,
only a quarter (n = 504) received the cash incentive upon
discharge, 68 % (n = 1353) were told to come back to re-
ceive the money. Assuming all JSY beneficiaries eventu-
ally receive the cash incentive, they would have a
median net gain (i.e., JSY incentive – OOPE) of $11. The
net gain was larger in district 2 ($19) compared to dis-
trict 1 ($8) (data not shown). As demonstrated in Fig. 1,
women from the poorest wealth quintile had twice the
net gain ($20) versus the wealthiest quintile ($10). Only
4 % (21/519) from the poorest quintile incurred OOPE
greater than the value of the JSY cash benefit.
Breakdown of OOPE among JSY and Home deliveries
Among the JSY and home deliveries, 92 % (n = 2213)
provided disaggregated cost information. Informal
payments (64 %) and food/baby items (77 %) were
the two most common sources of OOPE (Table 1).
The proportion of women incurring OOPE for food
and cloth items was higher for JSY beneficiaries
(81 %) than for home mothers (55 %). Among the
two groups, the median cost for food and baby items
was significantly higher ($5) for JSY beneficiaries
compared to home deliveries ($3). No other signifi-
cant differences were found.
OOPE differences by district were found. The break-
down of costs by category was similar for JSY beneficiaries
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and home deliveries with the exception of the proportion
of informal payments in district 2 (Fig. 2). Informal pay-
ments constituted only 5 % of the total OOPE for JSY
beneficiaries in district 2 compared to 43 % in district 1.
The proportion did not differ between districts among
home mothers. Among JSY beneficiaries, a higher
proportion of wealthy women incurred OOPE as well
as had higher median OOPE compared to the poorest
quintile.
Inequalities in OOPE among JSY and home deliveries
Figure 3 displays the concentration curves for OOPE
among JSY beneficiaries and home deliveries. Since both
curves lie below the line of equality; OOPE for both JSY
beneficiaries and home mothers was found to be pro-
gressive indicating that poorer households make propor-
tionally less OOP payments during childbirth compared
to wealthier households. JSY beneficiaries had less pro-
gressive OOPE (CI = 0.189) compared to women who
delivered at home (CI = 0.293), however this difference
was not significant. The difference was not significant
when each district was analyzed separately.
Impact of JSY on OOPE
When adjusting for confounders, women who delivered
in a JSY public facility had 1.58 higher odds (95 % CI:
Table 1 Background characteristics, median and inter-quartile range (IQR) of gross OOPE (in U.S. dollars) for women who delivered
in a JSY facility or at home. Column percentages (%)
All women JSY beneficiary Home delivery
Background characteristics n (%) Median (IQR) n (%) Median (IQR) n (%) Median (IQR)
Total 2381 (100) 8 (3–17) 1995 (84) 8 (3–18) 386 (16) 6 (2–13)
Age in years (median, IQR) 23 (21–25) – 22 (20–25) – 25 (22–27) –
Districts
District 1 1405 (59) 14 (7–23)* 1251 (63) 14 (7–23)* 154 (40) 12 (5–23)*
District 2 976 (41) 3 (1–7) 744 (37) 3 (1–7) 232 (60) 3 (1–7)
Education in years (median, IQR) 5 (0–8) – 5 (0–8) – 4 (0–7) –
Household wealth
1st quintile (Poorest) 519 (22) 3 (1–7)** 361 (18) 3 (1–6)** 158 (40) 3 (0–7)**
2nd quintile 505 (21) 7 (2–13) 414 (21) 6 (2–15) 91 (24) 7 (2–12)
3rd quintile 499 (21) 11 (5–18) 434 (22) 11 (5–18) 65 (17) 10 (3–18)
4th quintile 476 (20) 14 (7–23) 429 (21) 14 (7–23) 47 (12) 8 (3–19)
5th quintile (Least Poor) 382 (16) 13 (7–25) 357 (18) 13 (7–24) 25 (7) 17 (8–29)
Caste
Scheduled Caste (SC) 599 (25) 10 (4–19)** 502 (25) 11 (5–20)** 97 (25) 8 (2–17)**
Other backward caste (OBC) 904 (38) 12 (5–22) 807 (40) 12 (5–22) 97 (25) 8 (4–17)
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 598 (25) 3 (1–6) 430 (22) 3 (1–6) 168 (44) 3 (1–7)
General 280 (12) 13 (4–21) 256 (13) 12 (4–22) 24 (6) 16 (5–20)
Birth Order
1st child 932 (39) 8 (3–19)** 858 (43) 9 (3–20)** 74 (19) 7 (3–12)**
2nd child 838 (35) 8 (3–17) 688 (34) 9 (3–17) 150 (39) 7 (2–15)
3rd child 382 (16) 5 (2–14) 292 (15) 7 (2–15) 90 (23) 4 (1–12)
4th or more child 229 (10) 7 (2–15) 157 (8) 8 (2–17) 72 (19) 4 (0–9)
Type of Delivery
Vaginal Delivery 2303 (97) 8 (3–17)* 1917 (96) 8 (3–17)* 386 (100) 6 (2–13)
Cesarean Section Delivery 78 (3) 50 (21–93) 78 (4) 50 (21–93) 0 (0) -
Cost Categories
Medicine, supplies and procedures 224 (10) 3 (1–8) 181 (10) 3 (1–7) 43 (11) 7 (3–8)
Informal payments 1445 (65) 5 (2–8) 1187 (65) 5 (2–9) 258 (68) 5 (3–8)
Food/baby items 1695 (77) 5 (3–8) 1489 (81) 5 (3–8) 206 (55) 3 (2–8)
Transportation 328 (17) 3 (1–8) 328 (17) 3 (1–8) – –
*Wilcoxon-Mann–Whitney test, p-value ≤0.05; **Kruskal Wallis test, p-value ≤0.05. Column comparisons made
Sidney et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:71 Page 5 of 11
1.11–2.25) to incur any OOPE than women who deliv-
ered at home (Table 2, model 1). Women from district 1
had twice the odds (95 % CI: 1.30–3.18) of having OOPE
compared to district 2. Wealth, caste and birth order
were not significant predictors of incurring any OOPE.
However in model 2 among the women who had
incurred any OOPE (Table 2), those who delivered
under the JSY program paid 16 % less (95 % CI:
0.73–0.96) OOPE than women who delivered at
home. Women from district 1 paid more than twice
(95 % CI: 2.06–2.69) the OOPE compared to district
2. Increased wealth was also significantly related to
higher OOPE. Conversely, being from a scheduled
tribe and birth order (women with more children)
were related to having lower OOPE.
Discussion
This is the first study to our knowledge that models
predictors of OOPE among JSY beneficiaries and
women who deliver at home. We found the large ma-
jority of women in our study reported some kind of
OOPE. Among the JSY beneficiaries, the poorest
women had the largest net gain when the cash trans-
fer was taken into account. Further we found OOP
payments under the program were progressive with
the most disadvantaged wealth quintiles making
Fig. 1 Gross OOPE and Net Gain (gross OOPE minus the incentive $23) for women who delivered in a JSY facility (n = 1995), U.S. dollars. Legend:
JSY: Janani Suraksha Yojana; OOPE: out-of-pocket expenditures
Fig. 2 Breakdown of out-of-pocket expenditures by cost categories for JSY beneficiaries and women who delivered at home by district, n =
2213*. Legend: JSY: Janani Suraksha Yojana; *This graphs includes only women who were able to provide disaggregated costs (93 %)
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proportionally less OOPE compared to wealthier
women. Being a JSY beneficiary led to increased odds
of incurring OOPE, but at the same time a 16 % de-
crease in the amount of OOPE incurred compared to
women who delivered at home. Finally, wealth was
not a predictor of having OOPE, but it was an indica-
tor of how much the women would pay.
In our study, the descriptive and multivariable analysis
demonstrated that OOPE in the most vulnerable groups
(ST, poorest wealth quintiles and multiparous women)
was the smallest. This finding was consistent with another
Indian study performed by Mohanty et al. [14] on the
District Level Household and Facility Survey (DLHS-3), a
national level survey that was conducted in 2007–2008 for
births that occurred in the last five years [37]. They also
found the amount of OOPE increased with wealth and de-
creased with birth order. Although there is no universal
consensus on why a wealth gradient in OOPE exists, many
studies show a positive relationship between income and
health expenditures [38]. In other words, the wealthy pay
more as they can afford to.
In the descriptive analysis, we found OOPE was higher
for women who delivered under the JSY program. How-
ever when adjusting for possible confounders, the model
showed JSY beneficiaries actually had less OOPE com-
pared to women who delivered at home. Another Indian
study that also used data from the DLHS-3 found deliv-
eries conducted under the JSY program at a public
Fig. 3 Concentration Curve for JSY beneficiaries and women who
delivered at home study. Legend: JSY: Janani Suraksha Yojana; OOPE:
out-of-pocket expenditures
Table 2 Two part model OOPE ($) among women who delivered in a JSY facility (n = 1995) and delivered at home (n = 386)










JSY (Public Facility) 1.58 (1.11–2.25)* 0.84 (0.73–0.96)*
Districts
District #2 1.00 1.00
District #1 2.03 (1.30–3.18)* 2.36 (2.06–2.69)**
Household wealth
1st quintile (Poorest) 1.00 1.00
2nd quintile 1.49 (0.98–2.27) 1.19 (1.02–1.38)*
3rd quintile 1.53 (0.91–2.56) 1.33 (1.13–1.56)**
4th quintile 1.14 (0.65–1.99) 1.31 (1.11–1.55)**
5th quintile (Least Poor) 1.21 (0.64–2.31) 1.34 (1.02–1.49)*
Caste
Scheduled Caste (SC) 1.00 1.00
Other backward caste (OBC) 1.15 (0.76–1.73) 1.14 (1.01–1.28)*
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 0.97 (0.62–1.52) 0.70 (0.60–0.81)**
General 1.19 (0.63–2.22) 1.07 (0.91–1.26)
Birth order
1st child 1.00 1.00
2nd child 1.21 (0.82–1.79) 0.82 (0.73–0.92)*
3rd child 1.03 (0.63–1.68) 0.71 (0.60–0.83)**
4th or more child 0.64 (0.35–1.17) 0.69 (0.56–0.86)*
Adjusted for age, education and delivery type; JSY Janani Suraksha Yojana, AOR Adjusted Odds Ratio, IRR Incidence Rate Ratio, *p-value ≤0.05; **p-value ≤0.001
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facility had higher OOPE compared to home deliveries
[15]. This difference was not surprising as only a de-
scriptive analysis was performed and possible con-
founders were not taken into consideration.
Another probable explanation for these differences
is Mohanty et al. reported the amount of OOPE has
declined over time for women who delivered in public
facilities [14]. Further in 2011, the government of
India launched a complementary program to JSY,
Janani Shishu Suraksha Karyakram (JSSK), to elimin-
ate OOPE for pregnant women and ensure delivery
care was free of cost. Medicines, medical supplies,
procedures (surgery, diagnostics and x-rays) food, user
fees and referral transport were all supposed to be
covered under this program [7].
We found indirect costs (informal payments to staff,
food and items purchased for the infant) comprised the
largest proportion of maternal expenses. Direct costs
(medicines, supplies and delivery services) constituted
the smallest share of spending among both JSY benefi-
ciaries (4 %) and women who delivered at home (9 %).
Conversely, Skordis-Worral et al. [23] found in urban
Indian slums that direct medical costs were responsible
for the majority of OOPE. Context is extremely import-
ant when interpreting results for studies performed in
India given the heterogeneity between different parts of
the country and stark differences between rural and
urban areas. Our study was performed in a rural setting,
the poor in urban and rural settings experience different
kinds of access issues possibly explaining some of the
difference in results.
Free delivery under the JSY program?
High OOPE are a well-known constraint to the
utilization of delivery services where ready access to cash
is not available for many rural households, especially the
poor whose ability to pay can be temporal or mainly rely
on seasonal production like farms [39]. The vast major-
ity of women in our study incurred some amount of
OOPE. While these women paid less as JSY beneficiaries
compared to women who delivered at home, they did
not have a free delivery as intended by the public health
care system. As mentioned above, in this study the direct
medical costs were not the driving force behind OOPE,
but informal payments to the staff. A qualitative study
from the same area found women knew they were not
supposed to make payments to the staff but did anyway
out of fear of not receiving appropriate care in a timely
manner [40].
Although from the perspective of the Indian government,
the primary purpose of the cash transfer is to incentivize
women for a free delivery in a public health facility and not
to cover OOPE, the same qualitative study found many
women do in fact intend to use it to compensate for the
OOPE incurred [40]. Only 25 % of the women who deliv-
ered in a JSY public facility in our study received the cash
incentive upon discharge. While a previous study that took
place in the same area found 85 % of the women received
the benefit within two weeks of delivery [41], if the
cash benefit is expected by the women to cover their
OOPE, it needs to be received upon discharge. These
bureaucratic issues related to receiving the JSY cash
incentive and informal payments to public health fa-
cility staff members undermine the program and
could potentially cause future uptake problems if not
addressed.
Does JSY reduce financial access barriers?
Population based surveys have shown a significant pro-
portion of women report cost as the major barrier to an
institutional delivery, [2, 37] and other research reports
support this [10, 23, 42]. However, our model showed
JSY beneficiaries had lower OOPE compared to women
who delivered at home. In addition, it is important to
note the JSY beneficiaries in our study received a net
gain, especially among the poorest quintiles, after receiv-
ing the cash incentive ($23). Although this is to be
expected since the poorest quintiles paid the least, re-
gardless this would imply the program is reaching and
assisting the most vulnerable groups. In our setting the
incentive was more than adequate to cover the OOPE,
while an earlier study from Orissa found the magnitude
of the cash incentive was not large enough to compen-
sate for the entire OOPE amount [43]. Another Indian
study reported the JSY program provided women with
some financial protection, though it was limited and did
not cover the entire sum [14].
Further, the women in our study who delivered at home
did not cite financial barriers as the justification for a
home delivery. A recent qualitative study from the same
area also found that cost was not a deterrent for most of
the study participants who delivered at home [40]. This
implies other access barriers persist, some of which may
be remedied but not necessarily by a cash transfer.
JSY role in reducing OOPE inequalities and inequities:
wealth quintiles and OOPE in the JSY
Our concentration curves showed that the OOPE for
women who delivered under the JSY program was
pro-poor; poorer households made proportionally less
OOP payments during childbirth compared to wealth-
ier households (i.e., a progressive system). From a
strict equality perspective, the distribution was not
equal. However, some would argue the wealthier
households have the means to pay for services while
the poorer ones do not [44]. The OOPE may not be
equal; nevertheless the program is making OOPE
more equitable and fair.
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In general, health care financing systems that are pro-
gressive tend to have a redistributive nature. Taxes,
where wealthier households pay higher amounts of
money compared to poorer ones, is one example. Social
service provision by the government (e.g., offering free
delivery care) is another [44]. So while vulnerable groups
often have more healthcare needs, despite contributing
less, they are able to obtain the same service as their
wealthier counterparts. Yet, it is unknown whether the
poorest women are in fact acquiring the same level of
service. In our study, when comparing the prevalence of
different costs and the median expenditure between the
poorest and wealthiest quintiles of JSY mothers, it ap-
pears there is a higher prevalence of informal payments
among the wealthiest quintile and higher amounts are
paid. This may just reflect the fact wealthier women
have more disposable income to spend or do wealthier
women informally pay for better services even within
the same facilities? A program like JSY has the power to
promote equality and equity in access to delivery care,
and while several argue the overall quality of care ad-
ministered in JSY public facilities is low, [45–49] it is
still important to ensure all receive the best care possible
regardless of whether they have the means to pay for it.
We have presented differences in OOPE between the
two study districts throughout the paper. In district 1, a
woman is more likely to have an OOPE and pay higher
amounts. Since the OOPE amount was higher in district
1, JSY beneficiaries’ net gain was also smaller. These
findings were not surprising considering the heterogen-
eity between the districts. The women are much poorer
in district 2 compared to district 1 so this would have an
impact on the amount of money they spent. This also
has an implication for the relative worth of the incentive
to women in their respective districts. Another reason
could be attributed to the sampling methodology. While
district 1 included all blocks, district 2 only included 2
of the 5.
Methodological considerations
Though there have been some studies assessing the
OOPE experienced during childbirth in India, few have
looked at this from an equity perspective under the JSY
program. The previous studies have used secondary data
that did not allow for cost disaggregation, assessed a
time period when JSY coverage and overall institutional
delivery was low or were small in size [13–17, 23]. Fur-
thermore, in some studies the costs were collected for
deliveries that occurred in the previous five years, thus
probably suffered from substantial recall bias. Consider-
ing how quickly the JSY program has increased institu-
tional birth proportions in such a short period of time, it
is important to have recent data that reflects the current
situation.
Reports have found in many Asian countries that fam-
ilies borrow money to pay for maternal related costs
thus being forced to forego essential items like food and
education to repay the loans. These costs have a ripple
effect on the family for years to come [50]. We did not
enquire about the financing sources used to pay for the
hospital delivery costs. This limits our ability to under-
stand the role of JSY in providing financial protection
and reducing subsequent impoverishment. So while this
study has shown JSY beneficiaries have reduced OOPE
compared to women who delivered at home, further re-
search is needed to understand the magnitude of the re-
duction in relation to the family’s overall poverty status.
Many studies highlight the limitations (e.g., recall bias
and over/underreporting) associated with collecting
health expenditure data [51–53]. Cost data was collected
shortly after delivery and triangulated with other family
members to minimize recall bias. A disaggregated cost
collection design was used to improve accuracy and
avoid underreporting of expenditures. While our study
design minimized recall bias as the study participants
were interviewed within a week of delivery, we do need
to acknowledge the possibility of underreporting for
women who were interviewed in a health facility because
of staff presence.
The sex of the infant has been reported in the litera-
ture as a determinant of OOPE [14]. Data was not col-
lected on the sex of the infant, therefore we could not
adjust for it in the model. It is reasonable to assume in
this setting the infant’s sex would influence OOPE, it is
well documented that families make higher informal
payments when a male child is born [14]. This could
affect the precision of the analysis and the significance
of other explanatory variables could be overestimated.
However, we do not have any reason to think that the
sex of the infant is differently distributed among the two
groups.
There could be an argument for the payments made
to the dai to be considered as a formal payment and
classified as payment for ‘medicines, supplies and proce-
dures’. However we chose to classify these payments as
informal because (a) the dai is not formally trained, (b)
is not a part of the formal health system and (c) remu-
neration to the dai is negotiable i.e., there are not fixed
stipulated fees, she is remunerated often partly in cash
and partly in kind based on the ability of the mothers
family to pay and their relationship with the dai.
Sampling: The districts were sampled in the exact
same way with the exception of the number of blocks
chosen. However, the process of how the women were
selected for the study was the same in both districts. As
the districts in the state and in the rest of the country
are very heterogeneous, generalizability of our results
needs to be done with caution.
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Conclusion
OOPE is still prevalent among women who deliver
under the JSY program as well in home deliveries. In
JSY, OOPE varies by income quintile; the wealthier
women pay more OOPE. There is a net gain for all quin-
tiles when the incentive is taken into consideration,
highest gains occur for the poorest women. OOPE was
largely due to indirect costs like informal payments, food
and cloth items for the baby and not direct medical pay-
ments. Further, we found OOP payments under the pro-
gram were progressive with the most disadvantaged
wealth quintile making proportionally less OOPE com-
pared to wealthier women. Being a JSY beneficiary led to
increased odds of incurring OOPE, but at the same time
a decrease in the amount of OOPE incurred compared
to women who delivered at home. While wealth was not
a predictor of having OOPE, it was an indicator of how
much the women would pay. The program seems to be
effective in providing financial protection for the most
vulnerable groups (i.e., women from poorer households
and disadvantaged castes).
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Endnotes
1Caste is a historical form of social stratification. Al-
though the use of castes is now outlawed, social inequal-
ities and discrimination continue to persist as a result of
it. Other backward caste, scheduled caste and tribe are
groups of people historically subjected to social disadvan-
tage. They were awarded special status by the Constitution
of India that entitles them to specific social benefits.
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